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A Brief Synopsis of the Study
Poverty is an ubiquitous problem. Many solutions have
been tested by governmental and private agencies alike, yet
few have been totally successful. Poverty exists at about the
same level as it did a decade ago.
Traditional welfare programs, such as Aid to Families
with Dependent Children and General Assistance, tend to
perpetuate poverty because their tangible and intangible
benefits are so strong that welfare participants have little
incentive to get off welfare. Recognizing this phenomena,
most state welfare programs now incorporate, to varying
degrees, a workfare component into their design. Many cities
are implementing welfare reform programs. This paper examines
several of these programs and briefly analyzes their strengths
and weaknesses.
The central theme of the paper is that although the only
solution to poverty is income, this income must be obtained
through a fair wage and package of benefits received in return
for labor. Jobs, alone, can not eradicate poverty. They must
offer benefits at least comparable to the benefits received
while on welfare. This includes a package of sufficient
income to support a family, including health care, child care,
transportation and some type of "career ladder" so that a
worker can see an opportunity for growth in his or her job.
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This paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of a
pilot project which has been designed for two target
neighborhoods in Milwaukee. Known as The New Hope Project:
The Milwaukee Jobs Commitment, the goal of this project is to
provide jobs and benefits that offer the poor an incentive to
voluntarily choose employment over welfare. One of the
central tenets of the project is that all who work full-time
and year-round should be entitled to a wage and package of
benefits that puts them above the official poverty level.
The Milwaukee Jobs Commitment was designed by a steering
committee consisting of political, business and religious
leaders in Milwaukee, as well as welfare recipients and
community activists. As of this writing (May, 1990) the
project has still not been implemented, although it has been
in the design stage for nearly two years.
Milwaukee Jobs Commitment has the support of the mayor of
Milwaukee, Senator Herb Kohl, Congressmen Jim Moody and Gerald
Kleczka, as well as Dr. Howard Fuller, director of the
Department of Health and Human Services, and key business
leaders in the community. If the pilot project is successful,
it will be a used as a prototype for welfare reform throughout


















































DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM
An Overview
Two-thirds of America I s impoverished citizens, 32.5 million
Americans, are employed. These people receive no help from
the government and they continue to work and receive an income
that places them below the poverty line.
The poverty line for each family unit varies, depending on
the characteristics of the family unit (e.g. the age of the
head of household, family size and the ages of related persons
in the unit). The poverty line also is updated yearly as the
cost of living changes, as measured by the Consumer Price
Index.
As of 1964 no official mechanism was in place to measure
poverty in the United states, nor was poverty a focus of
government studies or programs. However John Kennedy,
influenced by the poverty he observed while campaigning
directed his Council of Economic Advisers to study the
problem. They determined that poverty was an income of under
$1, 500 for a person living alone and under $3,000 for a
family. The Social Security Administration developed an
alternate definition for poverty. As a base line, they used
data compiled by the Department of Agriculture in the 1950s
regarding the cost of an economy food plan, which would
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provide adequate nutrition, or what was called a market basket
of food. The Social Security Administration then multiplied
the dollar amount of the economy food plan by three, assuming
that families of three or more persons spend approximately
one-third of their income on food. For smaller families and
persons living alone, the cost of the economy food plan was
mUltiplied by slightly higher factors, to compensate for the
relatively larger fixed expenses of smaller families. The
Social Security Administration's method of determining the
poverty level was adopted as the framework for determining
poverty.
It is generally agreed, however, that the poverty line
depicts a minimal, if not inadequate, standard of living.
The Gallup organization has polled the American pUblic in
various communities for the last quarter century with the
question "What is the smallest amount of money a family of
four (husband, wife and two children) needs to get along in
the particular community. Consistently, the official poverty
line has been lower than the income those polled required to
"get along." (Gallup, 1978)
Although t~e official standard of measuring poverty (as
discussed previously) had not yet been established, the
national poverty rate was first calculated in 1959, when it
was 22.4 percent (The Milwaukee Journal, 8-31-1988). The rate
fell steadily as national anti-poverty programs were
developed, reaching a low point of 11.1 percent in 1973.
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Since then it has gone up and down, peaking at 15.2 percent
in 1983. The 1987 poverty rate was 13.5 percent, which
equated to 32.5 million Americans who lived in poverty.
(Milwaukee Journal, 8-31-1988) Figure 1.1 illustrates the





'60 '65 '70 '75 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87
Source: Census Bureau (cited in Riemer, 1988)
Figure 1.1
Percentage of Persons Living in Poverty
Poverty levels vary by race.
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In 1987 Whites had a 10.5
percent poverty rate, while the rate for Blacks was 33.1
percent and the rate for Hispanics was 28.2 percent.
Table 1.1 lists the official United states poverty levels
for households of different sizes in 1987.
Table 1.1
Official u.s. Poverty Levels, 1987
Household size Related children under 18 years
None 1 2 3
1 person (unrelated
individual)
Under 65 years $5,909
65 and older 5,447
Two persons
Head age 15 to 64 7,606 $7,829
Head age 65 or older 6,865 7,799
Three persons 8,885 9,142 $9,151
Four persons 11,715 11,907 11,559
Five persons 14,128 14,334 13,895 $13,555
six persons 16,250 16,314 15,978 15,656
Seven persons 18,698 18,814 18,412 18,131
Eight persons 20,912 21,096 20,717 20,384
Nine persons 25,156 25,277 24,941 24,659
Source: U.S. Census Statistical Abstract, 1988
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Only one-third of the poor receive public assistance,
primarily through welfare programs. The two-thirds majority,
however, works or is seeking work. The existence of such
large numbers of poor workers (Figure 1.2) suggests that many
people who are poor want to work, prefer work to welfare or
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Number of Families Who Work Yet Remain Poor,
By Family Type -- 1979 and 1987
Source: Congressional Research Service,
Current Population Surveys
(cited in New Hope Project Report, JUly, 1989)
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Milwaukee County has made strides in thwarting the growth
of poverty through a work relief program, Workfare, which was
initiated in 1981. Every able-bodied general assistance
recipient is required to perform some kind of work as a means
of "abating" the welfare grant. In 1985 the program was
broadened to include general education, skills training and
job placement.
This program may have contributed to the decrease in the
numbers of General Assistance (GA) recipients in Milwaukee
County. The county has experienced a 54 percent drop in
monthly general assistance cases from November, 1985 to
November, 1988 -- from 12,858 cases to 5,870 cases. (De Leon,
1989)
It has had little effect, however, on the numbers of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients. Almost
40,000 county households, or about 120,000 people continue to
receive $225 million in pUblic assistance through AFDC. (De
Leon, 1989)
In Milwaukee County the number of AFDC cases dropped 4
percent between the peak year of 1986 and 1988. (In November
1988, there were 36,916 AFDC cases.) During the same period,
AFDC cases dropped 15 percent for the rest of the state. (De
Leon, 1989)
Meanwhile, urban Milwaukee County continues to claim a
greater share of the statewide AFDC population. From 37.7
7
percent of the state's cases in 1984, it rose to 38.4 percent
in 1985, to 39 percent in 1986, to 40.2 percent in 1987 to
42.2 percent in 1988. These ratios appear even more
disproportionate when one considers that Milwaukee County has
19.5 percent of the state's population. More than 10,000 of
the county's AFDC families have received aid payments
continually for eight years or longer." (De Leon, 1989)
The increasing size of the caseload suggests that the
improving state economy and rising employment rates have not
benefited Milwaukee's poor as much as poor people located
elsewhere in Wisconsin. There are a number of possible
explanations:
--Employment, particularly in manufacturing, has rebounded
more slowly in Milwaukee than in other parts of the state,
according to a study by Sammis White, director of the Urban
Research Center at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
Manufacturing employment in the four-county metropolitan
Milwaukee area is 20 percent lower than it was in 1979,
although manufacturing jobs in the rest of the state are up
3 percent since 1979 and 10 percent since 1986. (White and
Zipp, 1988) While the numbers of manufacturing jobs in the
Milwaukee have decreased, the numbers of low-paying jobs in
food and service industries have increased. However, these
jobs may not offer financial remuneration sufficient to lift
people from poverty.
--Milwaukee's welfare population is different from the
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welfare population of the rest of the state. In Milwaukee a
much higher percentage represents minorities -- more
than 70 percent in Milwaukee County, as contrasted to 26
percent elsewhere. Minorities tend to have a higher
unemployment rate than whites. (See Table 1.2)
Table 1.2










Source: Bureau of the Census (cited in New Hope Project
Report, 1989)
One caveat to be aware of when reading unemployment data
is that unemployment rates are the official measure of
unemployment. Because the rates fail to incorporate data
regarding those discouraged workers who have stopped looking
for jobs, they tend to under-estimate real unemployment.
(Riemer, 1988)
--A higher percentage of Milwaukee's welfare recipients
live in one-parent families headed by women -- 82 percent,
compared to 67 percent in the rest of Wisconsin. In addition,
a smaller percentage work and also receive aid -- 11 percent -
- as contrasted to 28 percent in the rest of the state.
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--Furthermore, Milwaukee is acquiring the reputation of
becoming a welfare magnet because of Wisconsin's reputation
for superior benefits. A standard AFDC grant for a family of
three in Milwaukee County is $517 per month. That same family
would get only $288 per month in Michigan.
A study released in November, 1989 by the Wisconsin
Research Policy Institute, estimated that welfare recipients
who move to Milwaukee County from other states because of the
more generous benefits offered by Wisconsin are costing the
county $129 million a year. These costs include the costs
of education of the children of welfare parents and the
additional law enforcement expenses, as well as the
traditional welfare benefits. Wisconsin's welfare benefits
are ranked among the top ten states in the nation. (Wisconsin
Research Policy Institute, 1989)
--Poor minority groups, particularly Hispanics and
Southeast Asians, have grown in population in Milwaukee but
not statewide. For instance, the number of Southeast Asians -
- largely Hmong from Laos -- increased from 1,369 to 3,551.
These people often do not speak English and, as a result,
cannot meet the minimal requirements for most jobs in the
Milwaukee area. Therefore, they tend to have a higher welfare
rate than the general population. (Gilbert, 1989)
All of these factors suggest that welfare recipients in
Milwaukee are in a worse position to capitalize on job
creation and make the transition from welfare in times of
10
prosperity than are welfare recipients elsewhere in the state.
Although some steps have been taken to curb the spread of
welfare, the problems associated with welfare and the even
more pervasive problems associated with poverty still remain
as ominous and pervasive as ever. Welfare reforms are only
bandaids for the ubiquitous problem of poverty. until a
solution to poverty is found, Milwaukee County will make
little progress in helping its citizens.
Problem Summary
Despite economic growth and an elaborate welfare system,
poverty in Milwaukee County has not decreased over the last
decade. Many of the jobs available to poor workers do not pay
a sufficient wage to alleviate their poverty. Nor in many
cases the does the wage does provide sufficient monetary
incentive to encourage'the poor to work rather than to choose
welfare. Poverty pOlicies need to be structured to ensure
that people who work for a living earn the right not to be






A person can attempt to get out of poverty in one of two
ways through obtaining a job that pays an income above the
poverty level or through obtaining a variety of transfer
payments, subsidies and services. Although the actual
disposable income one receives when on welfare is not
sufficient to raise that person above the official poverty
level, many people opt for welfare for reasons this paper
shall discuss.
For purposes of this study, welfare is defined as those
services, commodities and direct cash outlays expended by
federal, state and local governments to alleviate poverty.
Welfare, for purposes of this study encompasses any subsidy
to a poor person which is not an exchange for labor. It
includes, but is not limited to, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), General Assistance (GA), including
food stamps and Medicaid, and that portion of Social Security
received by poor people. Welfare also includes those indirect
payments to providers of services in the medical or legal
professions, through Medicaid, Medicare, Legal Aid, etc.
Social services, such as day care and care for the elderly and
disabled are also part of welfare. Included also is the money
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spent on housing and neighborhood services.
Approximately $987,592,692 was spent to alleviate poverty
in Milwaukee County in 1988 by federal, state and local
governments combined. Table 2.1 gives a listing of the
various governmental programs in 1988 and the estimated
expenditures for each program. The data does not take into
account those programs that are available to the general
population but used disproportionately by low income people,
such as public education. It also excludes all private
subsidies to the poor, such as those made through churches,
shelters for the homeless, food pantries, charitable
foundations, United Way, etc.
The amount of expenditures was determined through
information supplied by each of the governmental agencies that
provided funds, programs or services for the poor. In several
instances discrepancies were noted in the reported
expenditures. For example, the Department of Commerce I s
Bureau of Economic Analysis reported financial data that did
not correlate with the expenditures reported on the books of
the individual agencies. When a budget discrepancy was noted,
the data from the accounting departments of the agencies was
chosen to be included.
Table 2.1
Public Spending for Anti-Poverty Programs
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To have a more comprehensive understanding of the magnitude
of cash outlays, the total expenditures are divided by the
total number of poor people, i.e. those whose incomes are
below those of the Official u.s. Poverty Levels (see Table
1.1). The estimated population for Milwaukee County for 1988
is 924,744. Although 1988 poverty rates were not available
for Milwaukee County at the time of this study, the rate has
been projected to be about 12.7 percent, according to the u.s.
Census Bureau. (Milwaukee Journal, 8-31-88)
Therefore, approximately 112,442 people have incomes below
the poverty level in Milwaukee County. By dividing the
expenditures by the number of poor people, one sees that
approximately $ 8,795 was the cash outlay in 1988 for each
person in poverty.
Of course, not every poor household has access to resources
of this magnitude, since many cannot or do not take advantage
of the services offered. Some groups, on the other hand,
utilize a disproportionate amount of welfare payment. An
article in The Milwaukee Journal (1-15-90) said that transfer
payments to Blacks, including AFDC, Social Security and Food
Stamps, accounted for nearly half of all income to Milwaukee
County's Black community, up from 9 percent in 1963.
Problems with current welfare system
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Expenditures of this magnitude would suggest that poverty
should be less prevalent than it continues to be. The
expenditures should result in self-sufficiency, however this
has not happened. Work levels among AFDC recipients have not
risen noticeably since 1967 (Mead, 1987). So then, what are
the flaws of the current welfare system that keep poor people
poor?
Little discretionary income: Part of the answer can be
attributed to how the expenditures are allocated among
services, commodities and cash assistance. From the data in
Table 2.1, one can compute that 51.5 percent of all
expenditures is for services and the costs of administering
those services; 7.5 percent is for commodities. Only 41
percent represents direct cash outlays to the poor, and from
this 41 percent the costs of administering the programs must
be subtracted. (Data is not available on administration
costs). The poor, in short, are given very little
discretionary income.
Limited freedom of choice: To exacerbate the situation,
welfare inhibits the function of natural supply and demand
curves. Frequently welfare recipients have limited freedom
of choice. In fact, they often are given only two choices --
to take the limited selection of goods or services authorized
by the government or to take nothing at all. If the
government offers a certain type of job training, for example,
welfare recipients may be forced to take it, even though their
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preferences may be for an alternative, such as college.
Services of inferior quality: Furthermore, welfare
recipients may have to settle for inferior services. For
example, reimbursement to health care is set at what is known
as the Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) amount. This level of
reimbursement is usually lower than the actual cost to the
provider. Thus two things occur -- an unwillingness of the
provider to continue to provide services to the welfare
recipient and cost shifting to the private payer. When
providers refuse to treat the poor, the market mechanism --
whereby the good providers are rewarded with increased
business and reimbursement and the inferior providers are
bypassed -- does not operate efficiently. The poor have to
settle for whomever will serve them, whether the providers be
good or inferior. Often, the poor are relegated to the
inferior provider.
Requirement to remain poor in order to obtain benefits:
The mainstay of the current welfare system, AFDC, which with
the medical benefits that are part of the AFDC program,
accounts for more than 54 percent of all welfare benefits.
AFDC requires that recipients remain poor. To qualify for
AFDC a person must have 1) little or no income; 2) less than
$1,000 in assets (not including a home and a car worth no more
the $1,500); and 3) a dependent child (or be at least six
months pregnant). As soon as an AFDC recipient fails to meet
these requirements, the AFDC benefits are cancelled.
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Disincentives to employment: AFDC contains strong
disincentives for the recipient to become employed. Prior to
federal program changes in 1981, a woman receiving AFDC who
was also employed was able to keep $30 plus 1/3 of her
remaining income each month without reducing her AFDC grant.
In 1981 the federal government imposed limits on the length
of time the $30 and 1/3 could be used. The effect was that
after four months of employment the grant is significantly
reduced. After 12 months of employment an AFDC recipient's
grant is reduced one dollar for each dollar of income earned.
This is the equivalent of a 100 percent tax on earnings!
Historic data proves that this system provides a strong
disincentive to employment: When this federal change was
enacted, employment among AFDC recipients dropped from 14
percent to 10 percent nationally, and from 24 percent to 14
percent in Wisconsin. (Loftus, 1989)
Welfare dollars generate fewer additional dollars: About
40,000 households in Milwaukee and 85, 000 throughout Wisconsin
are currently receiving AFDC, at an estimated cost of $202
million a year to the state and $322 million to the federal
government, with the total cost being $524 million a year.
The state reimburses counties for 37.5 percent of their
general assistance expenses and for 42 percent of their AFDC
expenses.
The true cost, however, is much higher, because it must
include the opportunity cost of wages that are not generated,
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taxes that are not being put into government coffers, and
human potential that is not being tapped and nurtured.
If, for example, each of the 85,000 households on welfare
in Wisconsin were to have one wage-earner earning $5.00 an
hour, those households would generate $850 million a year in
income ($5/hr. x 2,000 hrs./year x 85,000 households =
$850,000,000). If they also received health insurance from
their employers, at a cost of one-quarter their income, they
would be receiving the equivalent of $1.0625 billion a year
($850,000,000 + 212,500,000 = $1,062,500,000). Of course
these funds would generate more funds. The results would be
that the demand for goods and services would increase and
eventually more jobs would be created in response to the
increased demand. Wage earners would contribute tax dollars
to the city , state and federal government. Overall, the
economy of Wisconsin would be much more vibrant.
Welfare dollar worth more than a dollar of wages:
Actually, a welfare dollar is worth more than a dollar
received as wages for work. A dollar received in a paycheck
has to go much further than a dollar received from welfare,
when these additional costs are taken into account. Costs,
such as for transportation and child care, are incurred in
the process of earning wages through work. Therefore, for two
reasons -- the dollar of welfare forfeited for every dollar
of wages, and the additional costs incurred in earning a
dollar of wages -- AFDC recipients have disincentives to work.
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AFDC encourages mothers to remain single: The structure
of the welfare system not only discourages work, as described
in the preceding paragraph, but it also discourages family
unity, because a woman can often more easily qualify for AFDC
and other benefits if she has an "unformed" or broken family
(i.e., one or more children and no spouse) (Riemer, 1988).
People on AFDC have, by necessity, made dependency on it
a way of life, as shown in research by the Urban Research
Center of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee under the
direction of Sammis White (1988). White has found that in the
Milwaukee area the average duration on AFDC is 5.6 years.
Eleven percent of those enrolled on AFDC have left it for a
period of time, but then returned. The average recipient who
has been off AFDC has been on it 1.15 times between 1985 and
1988. This return to AFDC after having been off it implies
that the recipient, because of one reason or another, was
unable to be gainfully employed (White, 1988).
Those receiving General Assistance in Milwaukee seem to be
more prone to self-sufficiency than those receiving AFDC.
Before receiving GA, 58 percent of the recipients were
employed. The average GA recipient receives GA for only seven
months per period and claims to have received GA for an
average of one year and two months in total (White, 1988).
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Barriers to Getting Off Welfare
Welfare reform strategies often are only temporary band-aids
which may be a quick-fix, but fail to address the underlying
problems. Most importantly, welfare, whether reformed,
restructured or revised, remains a program to maintain people
rather than to support their integration into a productive
economic communityln addition several non-structural
barriers keep people on AFDC, including lack of training and
education, lack of child care, lack of health care, lack of
transportation to a job, and lack of well-paying jobs.
Lack of training and education: According to another study
by White conducted in the summer of 1985, welfare recipients
in Milwaukee have not achieved the same level of education as
their counterparts who are not on welfare. Among those
receiving General Assistance, more than half (56 percent) have
not completed high school or its equivalent. Among the AFDC
population not currently in school, 42 percent have not
finished high school. For the adult population as a whole in
Milwaukee, 32 percent have not completed high school. (White,
1985)
Literacy is another consideration of employability.
Throughout the united states only eight percent of the
population is estimated to be functionally illiterate, whereas
almost over four times that rate (30 percent) is found among
GA recipients. (White, 1985)
At the literate end, half the u.s. population can read at
22
the tenth-grade level, but only 14 percent of the GA
population can. This lack of literacy certainly limits the
number of jobs members of this population can perform and
bodes ill for their future employability, as more jobs in our
economy require literacy.
Of those polled by White's research team in 1986, only 58
percent of those with less than a high school degree or
equivalent had ever been employed, as contrasted to 73 percent
of those with high school degrees and 79 percent of those with
education beyond the high school level.
Lack of Child Care Facilities: Another strong disincentive
to employment is the lack of child care. The mean number of
children per AFDC household in Milwaukee is 2. 4 , wi th 34
percent of the families having one child and 30 percent having
two. Nine percent of the families have four children and
seven percent have five or more. (White, 1988)
In Milwaukee County 54,845 children are in families
receiving AFDC. Most children on AFDC are infants or toddlers
and require full-time day care.
Average day-care costs in the Milwaukee area range from
$67.50 a week for an older child who is cared for in a home
setting to $95 a week for an infant attending a group day care
center. (McCauley, 1989) A family with an infant and toddler
both needing day care easily can spend more than $8,000 a
year. If a person were to find employment at a job which paid
$4.00 an hour (a common wage for unskilled labor) and worked
23
full-time for a 52-week year, that person would earn only
$8,320 before taxes -- hardly enough to pay for child care,
let alone to live.
Even if a former welfare recipient were to receive a wage
that could support child-care payments, severe shortages of
child care facilities exist in the Milwaukee area. The 1989
capacity for child care in licensed facilities in Milwaukee
county is for 14,588 children. (McCauley, 1989) Projections
are not optimistic that the capacity will increase
sUbstantially within the year future, and several factors are
point to the conclusion that a shortfall will continue to
exist between capacity and demand, namely the low wages for
child care workers and the state's new workfare program which
strains existing capacity. (McCauley, 1989)
The new workfare program requires mothers of children as
young as 2 years to take employment. Previously mothers whose
children were under 6 years were exempt from the workfare
program.
An informal study of area day care centers recently
conducted by The Milwaukee Journal indicated that the average
starting wage for a day care worker is $4.50 and hour. Among
the qualifications for these starting workers is a bachelor's
degree in early childhood education (McCauley, 1989). This
low wage cannot be much of an attraction to a college
graduate.
Since new state program recipients of AFDC with children
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age 2 or older are required to work, there is additional
strain on the already insufficient number of child care
facilities in metro-Milwaukee. It is estimated in 1990,
51,688 children will need child care facilities in Milwaukee
County. Only 14,588 slots exist, so only two out of seven
children requiring day care will be able to have it.
(McCauley, 1989)
The resultant significant shortages in capacity may, in the
longer run, drive up the wages of child care workers, given
that more child care facilities are built. In the short run,
however, the problem is acute.
Lack of Health Care: Loss of health insurance if a
household leaves welfare is a major disincentive to work.
People who would prefer to work are faced with the choice of
working with no health insurance or staying on welfare where
the health benefits are comprehensive. However, the costs of
health insurance, co-payments, and deductibles are prohibitive
for those earning limited incomes.
The average cost of health insurance is $2,500 per
policyholder, according to the actuarial consulting firm of
Mercer Meidinger Hansen. (1989) Family coverage, depending
on the level of benefits, on the amount of co-payment and on
the level of deductibles, may be more than twice that amount.
In 1989 the estimated cost for family participation in a
Health Maintenance Organization was approximately $250 per
month, or $3,000 per year.
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These costs have been rising at a faster rate than
expenditures on any other category analyzed through the
Consumer Price Index by the Bureau of Labor statistic.
(Health Insurance Association of America, 1989)
The Health Insurance Association of America (HlAA)
estimates that the cost of medical care is rising at a rate
of about 12 percent a year. (HIAA, 1989)
Lack of transportation to a job: Jobs are in short supply
in the central-Milwaukee area but are readily available in the
suburbs. In the past decade business have relocated to the
suburbs. For example, in Waukesha County the supply of jobs
has nearly doubled since 1970, while during the same period
jobs in Milwaukee increased by nine percent. A drop in
manufacturing employment devastated Milwaukee's Inner City and
left one of every four black workers officially unemployed.
(White and Zipp, 1988)
Manufacturing employment in the Milwaukee metropolitan area
is 20 percent less than it was in 1979. (Gunn, 1989) Many of
the suburban jobs pay wages too low to be desirable to the
residents of the suburbs, but these wage levels are more than
satisfactory to impoverished residents of the city of
Milwaukee.
Many Inner City residents to not have the means to get to
jobs in the suburbs. The Milwaukee Transit System has few
bus routes to the suburbs and, according to a study by the
Milwaukee Urban League, 40 percent of Milwaukee's black
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households have no automobiles. Obviously, if unemployed
workers are to find jobs, they must have transportation to
those jobs. (Milwaukee Urban League, 1988)
Another transportation consideration is the amount of time
required for a resident of the Inner City to travel to a job
in the suburbs. Under optimal conditions the commute is 45
minutes to an hour each way. The addition of as much as two
hours in commuting time for a job that pays close to the
minimum wage is a strong disincentive to work.
In a survey of Milwaukee welfare recipients by Sammis White
(1988), it was found that ten percent said they felt hampered
by lack of transportation; 24 percent say this lack sometimes
interferes (it did not interfere if the job were accessible
by bus); 15 percent said that it is an occasional problem.
It can be concluded from this survey, therefore, that
transportation is a major barrier to employment for only 10
percent of welfare recipients, with pUblic transportation
being the major variable.
In July of 1988 a program called Job Ride was established
with a $200,000 grant from the state. This money was used to
subsidize Wisconsin Coach Lines' bus rides from the Inner City
to Waukesha and to subsidize the cost of operating several
vans to places of employment. The Milwaukee County Transit
System has also proposed van routes to aid in this "reverse
commuting," although they have not as yet implemented this
program. (Faris, 1988)
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Lack of well-paying jobs: The Milwaukee labor market has
lost 50,000 manufacturing jobs since 1979, however total
employment in the Milwaukee area is on the rise, with
virtually all the growth in jobs being in the lower skill and
lower pay trade and service jobs -- the type of jobs for which
welfare recipients are suited. (White and Zipp, 1988)
According to White and Zipp (1988), service industries
continue to dominate employment. In 1979 the metro-Milwaukee
area had 1.9 service jobs for every manufacturing job. By
1983 the ratio had risen to 2.5 service jobs for every
manufacturing job, and it has remained at that ratio since
then. The new jobs are less likely to be unionized and more
likely to rely on part-time workers to help hold down wage
costs. In addition, the source of job growth is in small
firms, as opposed to the trend toward growth in the large
manufacturing firms of Milwaukee's earlier decades. (White,
1988)
The average annual wage in 1988 in Milwaukee's 10 highest
growth industries in the service sector was $16,225, compared
with $18,775 in the industries showing the greatest decline.
Jobs in the 10 manufacturing industries with the largest
growth here since 1979 paid, on average, $8,000 less than
those in the 10 manufacturing industries that have lost the
most jobs in the same period. The 10 manufacturing industries
with the greatest growth paid $22,590 on average in 1986; the
10 with the greatest job loss paid $30,592 (White, 1988).
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While the overall 1988 unemployment rate in Milwaukee was
5.5 percent, the unemployment rates among minorities are much
higher -- 26 percent for blacks, 11.4 percent for Hispanics
and 13.5 percent for Native Americans. (Farris, 1988) These
numbers do not take into account hidden factors, such as the
numbers of illegal aliens and the numbers of people who have
given-up in their search for jobs. Including these factors,
the numbers of unemployed may be double (Farris, 1988).
Not only is it important that jobs be available, it is also
important to know what wage scale welfare recipients would be
willing to work for. Milwaukee's economy is an employers'
market, as evidenced by the low scale of wages. Many fast
food restaurants in the inner city still pay beginning workers
close to the minimum wage of $3.80 an hour, whereas on the
East Coast, McDonald's starting wage is as high as $6.50 an
hour. In Boston, clerical workers can easily earn $10 an
hour, but in Milwaukee there is an excess of clerical workers.
It is essential that jobs pay enough so that welfare
recipients can afford to take them. Of course the level of
pay differs as people's needs differ, but considering all the
costs -- transportation, child care, health care, meals on the
job, wardrobes, motivational and opportunity costs -- the pay
must be at a level high enough to compensate for these
additional imputed expenses.
White's research team surveyed GA and AFDC recipients in
1985 to determine the minimum income they would require to
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leave welfare. The mean income AFDC recipients with work
experience desired was $986 per month, after taxes. This
figure varied dramatically when broken down by age of mother
or by number of children. The average monthly take-home pay
required by families ranged from a low of $918 per month
($7.39 per hour pre-tax) for a family with one child to $1,139
per month for a family with four children. Mothers over the
age of 40 who had small children at home said they would
require $1,856 take-home pay per month ($13.91 per hour, pre-
tax) to leave welfare.
General Assistance recipients, many of whom appear to have
more work experience although not as much education as the
AFDC mothers, said they were seeking jobs that paid an average
of $4 an hour, pre-tax. Many said they would work for the
minimum wage (White, 1988).
Even at the $3.80 an hour minimum wage, the income of
approximately $684 a month before taxes is much higher than
the $175 a month a single adult receives on General
Assistance, even taking into account the fact that GA is not
taxed. It would appear that a welfare recipient would have
a monetary incentive to become employed.
The official poverty levels, by category, are higher than
the income levels of welfare recipients within the same
category. Workers who work full-time and year-round at the
minimum wage, earning $6,968, can escape poverty only if they
have no dependents. Although the federal minimum wage will
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soon be changing, it has remained at it $3.35/hour level since
1981. The purchasing power of"$3.35 in 1981 is worth about
$2.50 in 1988 dollars, when adjusted for inflation. (U. s.
statistical Abstract, 1988)
The Evolution of Welfare Programs
Job programs of the 1960s
Under the Kennedy Administration, programs to alleviate
poverty with a focus of jobs were initiated, namely the
Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 (MDTA) and the
Job Corps, which Congress approved in 1964. Both programs
were criticized for the following limitations:
The MDTA tended to be successful with only the most
highly motivated workers, who ultimately had a better
chance of finding employment, whether or not they had
participated in job training programs. Some of the
neediest poor, such as unskilled people in rural areas,
rarely had the opportunity to enroll in job training.
The hard-core unemployed in urban ghettos often failed
to get stable work, even after having completed job
training programs. (Patterson, 1986)
The dropout rate in the Job Corps program was about 33
percent. The program was also expensive, costing about
$7 , 500 per enrollee in 1965 dollars. However, Job Corps
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director otis Singletary refuted the criticism of high
dropout rates. His argument was that all of the
enrollees had already dropped out of high school, and
even among privileged college students, half do not
finish their studies. (Patterson, 1986)
Critics challenged the relevancy of the skills being taught
in the training programs. Job Corps typically sent
inner city youths to do conservation work in the
countrysides, which did little to give them skills that
would be useful in the business community (Patterson,
1986).
omnibus BUdget Reconciliation Act (OBRA)
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 was an
attempt by the Reagan Administration to reform welfare, in
particular AFDC. OBRA eliminated the "thirty plus a third"
rule by which welfare recipients, after four months of
consecutive employment, were permitted to retain the first $30
per month of earnings as well as one-third of the rest,
without having those amounts subtracted from their benefits.
In addition, OBRA cut monthly allowable deductions for work-
related and child care expenditures.
OBRA also allowed state governments to require recipients
of AFDC to work in assigned jobs or to actively search for
regular jobs, as a condition to receiving benefits. This
provision spawned a variety of state welfare employment
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programs, ranging from work-for-benefit programs to
comprehensive programs of education and training eventually
leading to employment.
states have found that in implementing workfare programs
it is necessary to not only determine welfare eligibility,
but also recipients' education, work skills and day care
requirements. In its first two years of implementation of
workfare programs, California, for example, discovered that
60 percent of the participants required remedial education.
The state had grossly underestimated this need, with its 20
percent estimate prior to beginning the workfare project (How
to Make Workfare Work, 1988).
As a result of OBRA, many states have established state
welfare employment programs. In his research, David A. Long
(1988) showed a correlation between the per capita income of
the state and the comprehensiveness of the program,
particularly in regard to the training element. Those states
with higher per capita incomes tended to implement what Long
termed "integrated program functions" that provided training
into their workfare programs. They also tended to combine
training programs that had previously been handled by more
than one agency under a single umbrella program.
As a direct result of OBRA, the sixteen states with the
highest per capita incomes, eight (50 percent) established a
"workfare" component; of the 17 states with mid-level per
capita incomes, ten (59 percent) established a workfare
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component; of the 17 states with the lowest per capita
incomes, ten (59 percent) established a workfare component
(Long,1988). In other words, the establishment of a workfare
component was independent of the state's per capita income.
Federal law generally exempts mothers of children younger
than 6 years from work programs. In Wisconsin, however, at
Gov. Tommy Thompson's request, the federal government has
allowed the age limit to be reduced to 3 months. (Loftus,
1989) In practice this limit is not enforced, but Wisconsin
mothers with children over the age of two are required to
participate in workfare. However, mothers are not forced to
participate in job training programs or to be employed unless
they are able to place their children in certified or
regulated child care programs.
Federal Family support Act and Workfare
The Family Support Act of 1988 (FFSA) was designed in
response to the growing recognition of the shortcomings of
welfare. Its intent was to lessen the abuse created by the
failure of absent parents to support their children and to
connect welfare to work, easing the transition by extending
child care and health care benefits.
The act's workfare provisions have been criticized as being
more punitive than constructive, since most states could not
provide access to jobs, let alone provide jobs that offer a
wage sufficient to support a family. The extension of health
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and child care benefits of FFSA is considered a plus, but had
a major flaw in that the denial of these benefits occurred at
a pre-determined time and had no correlation to the needs of
the recipient.
Earned Income Tax Credit
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), if generous enough,
can discourage people from staying on welfare by giving them
tax breaks for income earned in employment. It gives a tax
credit based on family size and the age of the children. The
current EITC, passed in 1988's deficit reduction bill, it
gives significantly smaller tax incentives to the working poor
than its designers had hoped for. A couple with four children
-- two under the age of six -- and a $14,000 annual income,
for example, will receive only a $1,615 tax break. For the
benefit to work effectively as an alternative to welfare, the
tax break should be more generous.
The EITC is an evolved form of the negative income tax
proposed by conservative economist Milton Friedman, and first
described in published form in his book, Capitalism and
Freedom (1962). In Friedman's plan the poor would be
subsidized in a program to be run by the Internal Revenue
Service. They would be paid a sUbsidy equal to 50 percent of
the difference between the sum of income and allowed tax
exemptions and deductions. A family of four with no income
and $3,000 in exemptions and deductions might get 50 percent
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of $3,000 minus 0, or $1,500 (half the poverty line used by
the government at that time). A family of four earning $1, 000
and entitled to $3,000 in deductions could get half of the
difference, $1, 000. Its total income would be $2, 000 --
$1 , 000 from income and $1, 000 from the government. The
negative income tax was designed to encourage the incentive
to work. Higher earnings would not be' completely be offset
by cuts in benefits. (Patterson, 1986)
Cashless Welfare System
In the summer of 1989 Milwaukee County Board members began
looking into the possibility of a cashless welfare system.
This would, if feasible, replace aid checks with vouchers,
electronic benefits transfers or other mechanisms to help the
recipients. Although this would not be an alternative to
welfare, per se, it would make welfare a little less
convenient and less easy to abuse, and in the long run might
encourage recipients to opt for employment. Vouchers for
housing could be used only for housing: vouchers for clothing
could be used only for clothing, etc.
A system such as this will further restrict the freedom of
choice of AFDC recipients. It will also encourage a cashless,
barter economy, with people trading vouchers for other desired
goods or services. It was proposed by the supervisors as a
response to record-high child abuse and neglect cases in the
county -- approximately 8,600 for 1989. A county study
36
indicated that 83 percent of the substantiated child abuse and
neglect cases in the county involved AFDC families. The
supervisors intended that the cashless would give greater
assurance that AFDC grants would be used for what they see as
their intended purpose -- the care and support of children in
poverty (Hanley, 1989).
A federal rule now limits the length of time an AFDC
recipient can be paid by voucher and a state law limits
voucher payments to cases that have substantiated bUdget
mismanagement (Hanley, 1989).
Work Relief Program
Participants in the Milwaukee County Work Relief Program,
which required welfare recipients to work in exchange for
welfare benefits, were polled in 1985 by White's research
group. Only about half of the participants were optimistic
that their participation in the program would lead to gainful
employment. The reason cited for their pessimism was that the
Work Relief jobs were only of. the "make work" type and they
did not help the participants develop marketable skills.
GA and AFDC participants, alike, said, when polled, that
they would like to see the Work Relief Program upgraded to
provide more real training and work experience relevant to




The only real alternative to welfare is employment, but
even employment is only a partial solution. For people to
choose work as a preference over non-work, they must have the
incentive to do so. Motivating factors for choosing work
include:
a meaningful job;
the skills that enable them to perform the meaningful
job;
remuneration for work which would be higher than
remuneration for non-work;
assurance that dependents would be cared for, despite
the absence of the employed provider;
transportation to the job;
assurance that their health needs will be met.
A non-profit organization in Milwaukee designed a pilot
project which is intended to meet the above criteria. It is
to be a experiment on a small scale, targeted at two areas
within the city of Milwaukee that are representative of the
welfare population of the city. Participation in the project
will be voluntary. Participants will be guaranteed an income
above the poverty level, and will have their health insurance,
child care and transportation provided. An additional
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proposal of the plan is to create a semi-monopoly on the pool
of available workers so that the workers can have more power
in negotiating wages and benefits. The project is to be
principally funded privately, so that it can have the
flexibility and so that it will be removed from the political
arena.
Project Overview
Known as "The New Hope Project: The Milwaukee Jobs
Commitment," this project is to be a three-year demonstration
project, with the goal of "restoring work to its central place
in the social contract," according to the written project
summary. (New Hope, 1989)
The project is based on the assumption that poor people,
given the chance to work, make a living wage and have access
to needed child care and health insurance, will choose work
over welfare and unemployment.
The project I s central philosophical assumption is that
people respond to structures that emphasize their inherent
dignity and their right to be responsible for choices they
make, of their own free will. It is also assumes that it is
more cost-effective to provide employment rather than welfare.
If both these premises are true, according to the reasoning
of the project designers, a state of equilibrium should be
achieved in which:
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--jobs will be provided because jobs are the most
economically efficient method of getting people out of poverty
--people will want to work, when given the option of
choosing between work and non-work
Background of the Sponsoring Organization
The original sponsoring organization of the welfare
alternative was Congress for a Working America (CFWA). The
Milwaukee Chapter of CFWA, one of nine in the united States,
was established in Milwaukee in 1981. CFWA is a private, non-
profit and non-partisan organization, with the goal of helping
un-employed and under-employed people gain access to and
retain family-sustaining jobs.
In the summer of 1988 CFWA-Milwaukee established a steering
committee and an advisory committee to design a project which
would be an alternative to welfare in Milwaukee County.
Comprised of nearly sixty representatives of community-based
organizations, religious organizations, organized labor and
people who are directly affected by the problems of poverty,
welfare and unemployment, these committees worked for a year
to design an alternative to the cycle of poverty and welfare
in Milwaukee County.
After the initial development of the project, it is the
plan that it will be sponsored by the entire Milwaukee
community under the auspices of the Greater Milwaukee
40
Committee. The project designers believe that one of the
critical success factors for the project is that it have as
wide as sponsorship as possible.
pilot Project
The Milwaukee Jobs Commitment (MJC) is a pilot project
involving only 600 people. The steering and advisory
committees decided to take the pilot project approach, as a
way of "test marketing" the idea. The pilot project will be
funded, in large part, by grants from business and
foundations, however it may reconsider some types of
government funding. The designing committee preferred private
funding over pUblic funding and to limit the size of the pilot
because:
with a smaller group, variables are more easily
controllable.
It is easier to fund a smaller project than a larger
project.
Private funding removes the project from the uncertainties
of the political process.
Project Design
The fundamental emphasis of the project is on jobs, which
are voluntarily chosen. Project participants volunteer to
participate. They will be given options, from which they can
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choose what is best for themselves, making their own jUdgments
about the relative value of incentives and work alternatives.
The intent of the incentives structure is to encourage
participants to achieve full-time, unsubsidized employment in
the private sector.
This project represents a radical departure from
traditional employment and training projects by emphasizing
work before training and incorporating the exercise of choice
within a framework of incentives.
The project will provide an incentive system of wage
supplements, child care and health insurance. It will also
link participants to existing resources within the community
that can aid in giving the participants the skills for job
retention and advancement.
The success of this project will be evaluated, both in
terms of its effects on individuals and the cumulative effects
of increased employment and higher income on the target
neighborhoods.
Program Enrollment and Options
Each eligible person in the neighborhood will meet with a
MJC staff person to select the various benefits and services
that meet the individual's family's needs. The participant
and the staff person will decide on a package from the
following menu of options:
1. The Project will assist the participant in immediately
42
securing employment at the person's skill level. This will
encompass a range of employment opportunities, including a job
search on the open market, a daily position obtained through
a staff job broker, or placement in a community service
position. If the individual is already working but earning
an income below poverty, a wage supplement will be provided.
2. The project will help to enroll the person's children in
an appropriate day care facili ty so the person will be
unencumbered by child care duties while working or looking for
work.
3. The project will enroll the person and his or her
dependents in a group health care program if the person's
employer does not provide appropriate health care coverage.
4 • The participant will receive from the project a wage
supplement to bring the person's income above the poverty
level for his or her family size.
5. A project staff person will refer the participant to
existing programs in the community that can aid the person in
job retention or skills development. This option would aid
participants wanting to move up the job ladder or to jump to
higher ladders of career development.
6. These supports will not be time-limited to 12 months. If
an individual's income is below 200 percent of the poverty
level for his or her family size, he or she will be eligible
for supports. Subsidies will be structured so that they taper
off as income approaches 200 percent of poverty. (See Tables
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3.1, 3.2 and 3.3)
Table 3.1






participant's potential annual earnings
Supplement provided by project
Total income, including supplement
Poverty line for family size (1988 dollars)
Earned Income Tax Credit for participant (1989dollars; does not include state EIC enacted in
June, 1989)
Earnings Supplement Income Povline Income v. Pov. EITC
$0 $0 $0 $7,730 ($7,730) $0$500 $99 $599 $7,730 ($7,131) $72$1,000 $198 $1,198 $7,730 ($6,532) $142$1,500 $297 $1,797 $7,730 ($5,933) $212$2,000 $396 $2,396 $7,730 ($5,334) $282$2,500 $495 $2,995 $7,730 ($4,735) $352$3,000 $594 $3,594 $7,730 ($4,136) $422$3,500 $693 $4,193 $7,730 ($3,537) $492$4,000 $792 $4,792 $7,730 ($2,938) $562$4,500 $891 $5,391 $7,730 ($2,339) $632$5,000 $990 $5,990 $7,730 ($1,740) $702$5,500 $1,089 $6,589 $7,730 ($1,141) $772$6,000 $1,188 $7,188 $7,730 ($542) $843$6,500 $1,230 $7,730 $7,730 ($0) $874$7,000 $1,176 $8,176 $7,730 ($446) $874$7,500 $1,092 $8,592 $7,730 ($862) $874$8,000 $1,008 $9,008 $7,730 ($1,278) $874$8,500 $924 $9,424 $7,730 ($1,694) $874$9,000 $840 $9,840 $7,730 ($2,110) $874$9,500 $756 $10,256 $7,730 ($2,526) $874$10,000 $672 $10,672 $7,730 ($2,942) $833$10,500 $588 $11,088 $7,730 ($3,358) $809$11,000 $504 $11,504 $7,730 ($3,774) $757$11,500 $420 $11,920 $7,730 ($4,190) $709$12,000 $336 $12,336 $7,730 ($4,606) $637$12,500 $252 $12,752 $7,730 ($5,022) '$607$13,000 $168 $13,168 $7,730 ($5,438) $559$13,500 $84 $13,584 $7,730 ($5,854) $507$14,000 $0 $14,000 $7,730 ($6,270) $437$14,500 $0 $14,500 $7,730 ($6,770) $409$15,000 $0 $15,000 $7,730 ($7,270) $337$15,500 $0 $15,500 $7,730 ($7,770) $307
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Participant's potential annual earnings
Supplement provided by project
Total income, including supplement
Poverty line for family size (1988 dollars)
Earned Income Tax Credit for participant (1989


























































































































































































































































Participant's potential annual earnings
Supplement provided by project
Total income, including supplement
Poverty line for family size (1988 dollars)
Earned Income Tax Credit for participant (1989
dollars; does not include state EIe enacted in
June, 1989)
Earnings Supplement Income *Povline Income v. Pov. **EITC
$0 $0 $0 $11,650 (11,650) $0
$500 $396 $896 $11,650 (10,754) $72
$1,000 $792 $1,792 $11,650 ($9,858) $142
$1,500 $1,188 $2,688 $11,650 ($8,962) $212
$2,000 $1,584 $3,584 $11,650 ($8,066) $282
$2,500 $1,980 $4,480 $11,650 ($7,170) $352
$3,000 $2,376 $5,376 $11,650 ($6,274) $422
$3,500 $2,772 $6,272 $11,650 ($5,378) $492
$4,000 $3,168 $7,168 $11,650 ($4,482) $562
$4,500 $3,564 $8,064 $11,650 ($3,586) $692
$5,000 $3,960 $8,960 $11,650 ($2,690) $702
$5,500 $4,356 $9,856 $11,650 ($1,794) $772
$6,000 $4,752 $10,752 $11,650 ($898) $842
$6,500 $5,150 $11,650 $11,650 $0 $874
$7,000 $4,922 $11,922 $11,650 ($272) $874
$7,500 $4,708 $12,208 $11,650 ($558) $874
$8,000 $4,494 $12,494 $11,650 ($844) $874
$8,500 $4,280 $12,780 $11,650 ($1,180) $874
$9,000 $4,066 $13,066 $11,650 ($1,416) "$874
$9,500 $3,952 $13,352 $11,650 ($1,702) $874
$10,000 $3,638 $13,638 $11,650 ($1,988) $859
$10,500 $3,424 $13,924 $11,650 ($2,274) $809
$11,000 $3,210 $14,210 $11,650 ($2,560) $757
$11,500 $2,996 $14,496 $11,650 ($2,846) $709
$12,000 $2,782 $14,782 $11,650 ($3,132) $657
$12,500 $2,568 $15,068 $11,650 ($3,410) $607
$13,000 $2,354 $15,354 $11,650 ($3,704) $559
$13,500 $2,140 $15,640 $11,650 ($3,990) $507
$14,000 $1,926 $15,926 $11,650 ($4,276) $457
$14,500 $1,712 $16,212 $11,650 ($4,562) $409
$15,000 $1,498 $16,498 $11,650 ($4,848) $357
$15,500 $1,284 $16,784 $11,650 ($5,134) $307
$16,000 $1,070 $17,070 $11,650 ($5,420) $257
$16,500 $856 $17,356 $11,650 ($5,706) $207
$17,000 $642 $17,642 $11,650 . ($5,992) $157
$17,500 $428 $17,928 $11,650 ($6,278) $107
$18,000 $214 $18,214 $11,650 ($6,564) $57
$18,500 $0 $18,500 $11,650 ($6,850) $7
$19,000 $0 $19,000 $11,650 ($7,350) $0
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Exiting and Re-entering the Project
1. Participants in the project who lose a job in the private
sector will immediately be offered community service work.
No arbitrary limit will be placed on the numbers of times a
person may seek another job.
2. Participants in the project will be encouraged to move to
better paying jobs through the incentive inherent in the wage
supplement formula. They will also be encouraged to pursue
additional training, if they desire.
3. People may leave the project at any time. They will
automatically graduate from the project when an unsubsidized
job is secured.
4. As a participant's income increases, the cost of that
person to the project will be reduced through decreased use
of supplements and services.
Operational Components of the Project
Eligibility
MJC will focus on individuals over the age of 18.
Eligibility will be based on the individual's or family's
income being below the poverty line. If the family's income
exceeds 200 percent of the official poverty level, the
individual member of that family is ineligible to participate.
Enrollment in the project will be totally voluntary. The
voluntary component is most necessary, considering the central
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tenet of the project's philosophy, namely that given the
choice, the poor would chose the option of working for a
reasonable wage over welfare.
Program Enrollment and options
A) A participant has three options for employment: a
permanent private sector job, a temporary, brokered job, or
a semi-permanent job in a community service capacity.
B) Day care facili ties will be provided for dependent
children . Although these services will not be free, they will
be greatly subsidized.
C) The project will enroll the worker and his/her
dependents in a group health care program, if the employer has
not provided that benefit.
D) The participant will receive from the project a wage
supplement to bring the person's income above the poverty
level for his/her family size. (See Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3)
E) A project staff person will refer participants to
existing programs within the community that can aid in job
retention or skills development. Participation in these
resource programs would be voluntary, but would be useful for
those wishing to move up the ladder of career development.
Private Sector Placement
Milwaukee Jobs Commitment emphasizes private sector
employment because it is from private sector employment that
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people obtain the skills necessary to build long-term and
financially rewarding careers. Private sector jobs in which
the employees perform a marketable service in a competitive
environment are the key to the perpetuation of jobs.
Community service ("make-work" types of jobs) tend to
evaporate when the funding evaporates, leaving their workers
without anything.
It is the goal of the project to exploit existing
employment opportunities rather than to create new jobs. If
a need already exists and an unemployed person can fill that
need, the employment process is more economical and efficient.
The project considers temporary jobs as a viable option,
insofar as temporary jobs lead to permanent jobs. Ideally,
project participants will find permanent employment on the
open job market, and use the project for assistance in child
care or health care or for help in breaking down any of the
other disincentives to employment. (See Table 3.4)
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Table 3.4













People seldom advance in a straight
line. Individual support and education
playa significant role in the potential
for increased ea-rnings and security.
The MJC will use actual work experience
as the context for an individual's
decisions to seek training, further
education or a different kind
of job.
Not everyone will move up the rungs of
a career ladder. For those who have
the desire, MJC will have the capacity
to support the motivation.
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Target Neighborhoods
The MJC pilot project will be targeted to two neighborhoods
in Milwaukee, each having a high level of unemployment and
welfare utilization. The neighborhoods have relative
residential stability, racial and ethnic populations
characteristic of the total group of poor in greater
Milwaukee, and are conveniently located near community
resources. It is important that the areas have residential
stability so that the results can be accurately monitored over
the three-year period.
Northside: The Northside target neighborhood is bounded
by 32nd street on the east, 40th on the west, Vliet on the
south, and North Avenue on the north, and is within ZIP code
53208.
Southside: The Southside target neighborhood is bounded
by Kinnickinnic Ave., 16th Street, Washington and Becher, and
is within ZIP code 53204. The total population for the two
neighborhoods is 29,456, with 15,129 people in the Northside
neighborhood and 14,327 people. in the Southside neighborhood.
Welfare utilization is high in each area, so the project
designers considered them excellent testing grounds for
testing the hypothesis that given the choice between
productive work and welfare, the poor would prefer to work.
Table 4.5 details the number of welfare cases as of Nov.
9, 1988 by the corresponding target area ZIP codes. Welfare
data is available by ZIP code only. Because the samples are
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data is available by ZIP code only. Because the samples are
smaller than the entire ZIP code areas, this data reflects
greater welfare utilization than within the targeted areas.
Table 3.5
Welfare utilization in Targeted Zip Code Areas
Zip Code GA AFDC Food stamps Med. Assistance
Northside
53208 810 4,254 5,433 4,927
southside
53204 449 3,541 4,395 3,835
-------------------------------------------------
Total 1,259 7,795 9,828 8,762
"Brokering" of Jobs
The project is designed so that participants will be
"brokered" for temporary jobs. If access to a large pool of
employable workers can be limited, those that have access to
these workers gain a degree of leverage. This semi-monopoly
on the labor pool results in bidding up the wages and benefits
employers are willing to give workers.
Currently, Milwaukee has 140 temporary employment agencies.
The operation of these agencies works to the benefit of the
agencies themselves and to the detriment of the workers.
Because each agency competes with 139 others for the pool of
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available jobs, the agencies have an incentive to offer
workers at the lowest possible cost to the employer. If only
a few agencies were in the business of finding jobs, the
competition for jobs by agencies would be less, although the
employers' demand for workers would be the same. Employers,
then, would pay a higher wage and offer more benefits to
workers.
Although, at first this component may appear naive, the key
to its implementation is in the voluntary enrollment of
workers with a particular agency. The incentive for them to
enroll with the agency would be the greater personal benefit
they would realize in so doing. If the increases in the
compensation employers are willing to pay are passed on to the
workers rather than to the job brokers, the workers will seek
these more favorable brokers. If the supply of workers can be
accessed through limited channels, the workers gain more
leverage in negotiating favorable wages and benefits.
Community service Jobs
Although the project emphasizes private sector employment,
it is expected that many people will be unable initially to
compete in the private labor market. It is also assumed that
there are more workers available than there are jobs, and some
jobs must be created to fill this shortfall.
Community service jobs will be designed to give workers
marketable skills. They are intended to be a temporary first-
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step on the way to private-sector employment. They will be
available in non-profit organizations and co-ops. These jobs
will generally pay less than private-sector jobs, so the
workers will have a personal incentive to move to something
more lucrative. The maximum length of any community-service
job will be one year. The jobs must provide appropriate
opportunities for the workers to learn marketable skills.
MJC will monitor the community service placements, to
ascertain that appropriate jobs are being offered. Project
participants who obtain these jobs will not supplant non-
project workers or take jobs away from others. By doing so,
the project would not be serving the greater good of the
Milwaukee community.
The income for community service workers would come from
the project, and would consist of two components -- a minimum
wage plus a supplement. Community service jobs offer a
limited earning potential; the incentive to move to a higher
paying job would encourage workers to view these jobs as
temporary.
The host organization will delineate the parameters of the
job, however the project will monitor its quality and
appropriateness. The host organizations and the project will




Most of the people in the target neighborhoods will only
be able to obtain jobs which pay at or near the minimum wage.
The minimum wage is not a sustaining wage, even if a person
works full-time for 52 weeks a year. If working is to be a
financially viable alternative to welfare, supplements are
necessary.
MJC will offer supplements to all program participants.
The supplements will be at a level so that the sum of wages
paid plus the supplement will raise their gross level above
the poverty line, if the participants work full-time and year-
round. (Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3)
Other goals of the wage supplement are to:
--Encourage the working poor to work full-time
--Encourage the working poor to seek and hold increasingly
higher paying jobs
--Minimize the total cost of the wage supplement component
itself.
Design of the supplement:
1. Wage supplements are based on a 40-hour weeki 48-week
year, to allow for holidays and vacation days, as are
customary in the working environment. Part-time wages will
be subsidized on a pro-rated basis.
2. Wage supplements will be provided in increasing
increments up to earnings, matching 100 percent of the minimum
wage. As the wage plus supplement approach the specified
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dollar limit for the person's family size, the size of the
supplement will decrease.
3. The disbursal of the supplement will be administered
through a financial institution.
4. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) will be utilized
whenever possible as a means of reducing the project's cost
for wage supplements. This is a state tax credit available
to income-eligible persons with children.
5. Part-time workers will receive a pro-rated supplement,
based on the number of hours they work.
Child Care
Lack of child care prevents many otherwise willing workers
from accepting jobs. Its high cost and the inadequacy of
childcare assistance programs such as TitIe XX are
disincentives to getting jobs. MJC will incorporate a child
care component into its design.
Assistance will be provided on a sliding scale, depending
on the recipient's income. The parent will begin to be
responsible for a co-payment portion of the cost, when his/her
income equals or exceeds 25 percent of the difference between
the minimum wage and the maximum wage supplement for the
family's size. When a participant's income exceeds 200
percent of the poverty level, he/she will no longer be
eligible for assistance.
Project participants may chose group day care or family day
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care services, as long as the provider is licensed or
certified. Payments for the child care will be made directly
to the provider.
Currently about 75 percent of the 6,434 parents in the
target neighborhoods have informal day care for their
children, in a "latch key" type of arrangement with neighbors
or relatives. About 22 percent of the children have a parent
who is at home with them on a full-time basis (Milwaukee
School Census, 1988). Only 3 percent of the children are in
formal day care programs (United Way Day Care Study, 1988).
Health Insurance
It is also a belief of the project designers that people
are entitIed to health care, if needed. Because people
receiving pUblic assistance receive comprehensive health
benefits, participants in the Milwaukee Jobs Commitment should
have the same calibre of benefits if this study is to be
appropriately designed. Health benefits comparable to those
offered through Title XIX will be available for project
participants. This is a high level of coverage and it
includes office visits, hospitalization, dental care and
prescription drugs.
Although the cost of health care is expensive, the project
designers have opted to make it mandatory because illness,
though seldom anticipated, may be even more costly than
insurance. The project designers believe that especially
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those people who are poor need insurance because they have no
excess funds in reserves for protection in the event of
illness.
Participation in the health insurance plan will be
mandatory. Participants will pay a portion of the insurance
costs on a sliding scale basis, similar to the scales used for
the childcare component. A minimum co-payment for services
will be required, (e.g. $2 per prescription).
The project design assumes that 40 percent of the
participants will not require health insurance through the
project, because of employer health insurance programs.
other Support Services
Milwaukee Jobs commitment recognizes that project
participants will need support services and access to further
education and training. Well-developed services to serve
these needs already exist in the Milwaukee community, which
the MJC will utilize. It will create working relationships
with a variety of groups and .programs to provide assistance
in:
education
training, such as on-the job training and apprenticeship
programs
mental health therapy or alcohol and drug counselling, if
needed
MJC will have some internal job searching and retention
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support groups which will be staffed by volunteers and staff
members. Peer support groups will be encouraged.
Milwaukee Jobs Commitment will provide participants with
information and referrals for existing community resources in
education, training and social services. It will encourage
continuing education and training by making participants aware
of training and educational opportunities already available
within the community.
A partial listing of Milwaukee organizations with whom
Milwaukee Jobs Commitment intends to work includes: Career
Youth Development, Carpenters Union, De Paul Clinics,
Esperanza Unida, Interfaith Conference Mentor Program, ITT,
Milwaukee Area Technical College, Milwaukee Public Schools,
SER Jobs for Progress and the Social Development Commission.
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Marketing strategy





At each phase in the process, because the goals and the
targeted market vary, the marketing strategy should also vary.
The Preliminary Phase
The marketing during this stage should be low-keyed and
concentrate on "testing the waters" for support and interest.
Press releases should be limited and should focus more on the
problem of poverty rather than on the MJC project, per see
This approach is recommended because it is unknown whether
MJC will indeed be operational. To say too much before the
existence of the project is a certainty and before all the
operational components are fully designed may result in a
credibility problem. By educating the community to the
problems of poverty and welfare, the ground will be more
fertile in bringing the project to fruition.
This is a time to quietly gather support for the project
by taking it to key community leaders in the political,
business and religious arenas. If key community leaders can
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feel as if they are a part of the project during its
inception, they may have a vested interest in adopting it when
it finally takes on a life of its own. The broader the base
of support in this initial stage, the better the odds for
success in the implementation phase.
Another part of the recommended strategy at this time is
to send out feelers to foundations and benefactors, not with
the intention of soliciting for money, but the stated purpose
of asking for advice as to the criteria these groups use when
selecting projects they wish to support.
Foundations generally make broad-based information
available. Although this is useful, more specific, "insider"
information should be solicited. By asking foundation
directors for advice without asking for a commitment of funds,
much useful information can be gleaned.
To continue in the information-gathering mode, it would be
most useful to contact key people who have successfully
implemented similar projects in other cities. By getting
their input and learning from their successes and setbacks,
MJC's odds of success will be better. This is the time to
visit with as many key groups in other welfare alternative
projects as possible, including the project participants as
well as the project designers.
This is also a time to get input from perspective project
participants in the Milwaukee community. By clearly
understanding their needs and constraints upfront, the project
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design can be more finely tuned.
The Fund-Raising Phase
This phase rapidly gets into full swing once the project
has been designed. It is crucial to the success of the
project that the people with the power to implement the
project support it. This is a time to work strongly with the
leaders in politics, business and religion. The politicians
can effect change through legislation and public support;
business can effect change through monetary support; the
churches can effect change through mobilizing pUblic opinion.
This is also the time to send proposals to philanthropic
organizations. without external funding, the project will
fail.
This phase is characterized by hesitancy, concern and
skepticism on the part of those in power to make MJC a
reality. Before they commit themselves of the wisdom of
supporting the project, they need to be convinced of its
soundness and its potential to effect change. They also must
the cost of the project is justified by the benefit the
Milwaukee community will receive through project
implementation.
The promotional strategy should focus on informing key
people of the benefits of the project without any attempt at
hard-sell. It should be implemented in this manner:
1. Television and radio talk-show programs should have spots
with project designer and Milwaukee Budget Director David
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Riemer his boss, Mayor John Norquist, and Howard Fuller.
They should discuss the problems of poverty of the
Milwaukee Jobs Commitment proposal.
2 • Key community leaders and foundations should be sent
articles describing similar projects in other cities.
Included with these articles should be a letter from the
mayor, endorsing the Milwaukee Jobs Commitment.
3. The press should receive the same packet of information~
4. Religious leaders in the target areas should be visited by
steering committee members, who explain the project. The
intent would be that the religious leaders would promote
the project as "A New Hope" for the congregation.
5. During this informational phase, it is important that two-
sided messages take place, i.e. those that are receiving
the messages must be able to respond to them. Their
questions and concerns must be first recognized and then
addressed. Mailed press releases are informational and
It is
important, but can in no way supplant direct conversations,
question/answer sessions or round-table discussions.
As of this writing, this phase is in progress.
being implemented in this manner:
1. Mayor John Norquist has phoned key business CEOs in the
Milwaukee area, briefly describing the project and asking
them if they would invite a member of the steering
committee to explain the project in a brief lO-minute
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session. As the request has come from the mayor, all
business leaders have consented to listen to the brief
presentation. They have exhibited a conservative attitude
toward the project, with each waiting to see what the
others will do.
2. The Greater Milwaukee Committee held a joint meeting with
the Milwaukee Council of Churches, during which the project
was explained. The Greater Milwaukee Committee decided to
further study the project. It has formed a committee to
do so and to report back to the group at large.
3. Several national and local foundations have been contacted
and they have expressed interest in the project. Proposals
have been sent to them and key members of the steering
committee have met with the foundations' decision makers.
4. All local, state and federal legislators who have
constituency in the Milwaukee area have been visited by at
least one member of the steering committee.
5. Howard Fuller of the Department of Social Services has
given his philosophical support to the project.
6. A key leader in the Milwaukee business community, Kenneth
R. Willis, president of Time Insurance Company was
appointed chairman of The Greater Milwaukee Committee's
task force studying the project. willis and Time Insurance
have a strong vested interest in building the labor force
in the city of Milwaukee. Because of rapid expansion, Time
has hired 500 new employees in the past two years. They
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experienced difficulty in finding enough qualified people.
Willis, therefore, has a strong vested interest in seeing
this project become successful.
The Implementation Phase
This phase has goals that are quite distinct from the other
two phases. In the end, the success of the project is
dependent on the ability of the participants to rise from
poverty. Marketing can be effective in helping to achieve
that goal by developing a metro-wide campaign to find jobs.
Ideally, the Milwaukee Jobs Commitment will have been
adopted by the key organization of business leaders, The
Greater Milwaukee Committee. This group will be able to
identify existing employment opportunities and will have a
vested interest in seeing that the project is successful. The
long run benefit to Milwaukee's business community, if the
project is successful, is larger and higher calibre pool of
workers from which to choose.
If the business community. feels some ownership of the
project, it will feel a corresponding commitment to its
success. Therefore, the involvement of the Greater Milwaukee
committee is a key element in the success of the project.
During the implementation phase, participants will be
offered help in job placement through existing private and
pUblic agencies. Select Staff, which is a temporary help
agency affiliated with the Congress for Working America, will
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be a key agency in placing project participants in jobs.
The project will target some of its funds to incentive-
based contracts with outside placement agencies. The dollar
amounts will be based on two factors -- permanent placements
that endure beyond four months and on the wage and benefit
levels of the jobs secured. The better quality jobs will
produce higher remuneration for the agencies.
Additionally, the marketing strategy during the
implementation phase should:
1. stress the positive aspects for employers in hiring
participants, such as the motivation of the workers, the
good of the Milwaukee community and the support network
that will help to keep the workers motivated.
2. Make employers aware of the possible tax breaks, through
the targeted-jobs tax credit, which gives employers up to
$2,400 for hiring a young, disadvantaged worker.
3. When working with project participants, it is important
that they are motivated to work. Their continued
participation in the work force is the central tenet of the
project, namely that jobs are preferred to welfare.
Therefore, it is most important that project participants
are motivated to work.
Ancillary marketing material should be available for
project participants which stresses critical success factors,
such as motivation, good working habits, attendance at the
job, etc.
66
Because the routine of daily work may be more demanding
than the accustomed freedom of lifestyle for welfare
recipients, project participants need to keep motivated and
they need the support of family members and peer groups. Group
meetings or social gatherings which include family members
will help to foster support. If participants or their
families need more personal advice, counselors should be
available.
Marketing within the implementation phase should also be
directed to community organizations within the target
neighborhoods. The neighborhood organizations and churches
should be well-informed of the goals of the project and of the
good the project is doing for the community. Community
organizations and churches can be a strong factor in
reinforcing the goals of the project.
The media promotion of the project during the
implementation phase should consist of press releases with
feature articles on personal success stories from
participants' viewpoints and employers' viewpoints as well as
data that shows the financial benefits of the project.
Project directors should be available for TV or radio talk
shows.
The mayor, legislators and key business people should
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*The budget would be the same for each of the three years.
**Evaluation is required by the donor foundations. This is
the recommended cost set by them.
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BUdget Narrative
If the proposed 600 workers participate in Milwaukee Jobs
Commitment, the average first-year cost for each participant




Director -- Responsible for the administration of the pro~
Financial Manager --Responsible for all internal financial
matters and management of benefits
Placement Managers -- Work with participants, helping them
with job search, benefits, referrals for education and
training, etc.
Community Service Developer -- Negotiates community service
placements among non-profit organizations and workers
Community service Crew Leaders -- Coordinate jobs within
neighborhood and work crews' shorter-term projects
Clerical -- One clerical worker for each site
Fringe Benefits -- Based on 35 percent of the projected income
of staff
Incentive-based outside Placement Fees -- Performance-based
to organizations that place individuals in permanent jobs.
Fees will be scaled according to pay level of placement,
i.e. the higher the wage, the higher the fee.
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site Preparation Costs -- $15,000 for two sites, to cover
office set-up and equipment
Operating Expenses -- Costs of operating offices, including
rental, supplies, phone, etc. and cost of liability
insurance for staff and board
Miscellaneous -- Petty cash, contingency fund for bus tickets,
etc.
Program Costs:
Wage Supplement -- Needed to bring the 600 participants'
income to a level that is above poverty
Community Job Costs -- Salaries needed to pay the base wages
of an estimated 170 workers participating in the community
service jobs, and insurance and vehicle costs for
neighborhood crews. The estimate of 170 is based on the
assumption that the real unemployment rate for the target
areas averages 30 percent.
Child Care -- Needed to cover the projects' portion of child
care costs, and based on a 70 percent rate of family
participation
Health Care -- Needed to pay the project's portion of a
comprehensive health care plan, and based on 60 percent
participation of families (those not covered through
employers' plans)
Project Evaluation This is required by the donor
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foundations. This section is based on input and
recommendations received from them:
The primary criteria for measuring the success of Milwaukee
Jobs commitment is the evidence of public policy changes that
have a positive effect on poverty. These changes may not be
directly traceable to the project, per se, but they will be
evidence of a change in the pUblic attitude toward poverty.
This change in attitude in one of the primary goals of the
project.
The project evaluation will focus on the changes in
individuals and in the target neighborhoods.
The Individual:
Information on each of the 600 participants will be
maintained throughout the three-year demonstration period, so
that the progress of each individual can be tracked over time.
critical components of the evaluation of participant outcomes
will include:
--Changes in employment status and wage and supplement
rates at six-month intervals
--Career and earnings mobility
--Degree to which participants stay on the work track
versus the welfare track.
The Neighborhoods:
The evaluation will examine the effect of higher employment
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of the two target neighborhoods, by looking at the following
indicators:
--Changes in welfare utilization
--Changes in indicators reflecting quality of life, such
as crime, delinquency and residential stability
--Changes in aggregate income for the neighborhood
--Rate at which neighborhood residents join the project
versus the attrition rate
It will be easier to assess the impact of the project on
individuals rather than on the community. This is because






Federal Waiver of Funds
As this solution is being proposed, other welfare
alternatives are also being implemented in the state. These
are at the encouragement of the federal government that is
matching in a 50/50 arrangement proposed and government-
sanctioned alternatives to traditional welfare programs. As
of April of 1990, $95 million of federal dollars was available
to welfare alternative programs within the state of
Wisconsin. Currently these funds, known as the Federal waiver
Savings, are available only to programs that are already
working within the existing welfare program, such as state,
county, Job Service JOBS agencies and Native American tribal
agencies. The programs must have a job element that can make
it possible for people to get out of the welfare cycle. The
fact that these funds are being made available supports the
idea that the federal government does not see the current
welfare system as the ultimate answer to the pervasive problem
of poverty.
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Building Employment Skills Today (BEST)
BEST is a comprehensive package of programs designed to help
people receiving welfare break the cycle of welfare dependency
by building employment skills. It is an umbrella program
consisting of various programs that give welfare recipients
education and job training, assistance in the job search and
job placement, work experience in community jobs, child care
health care and child support. Among the programs under
BEST's umbrella are:
Community Work Experience Program (CWEP): a program
intended for those who lack job skills; CWEP provides
unsubsidized employment in the pUblic sector.
-- Work Experience and Job Training Program (WEJT): a program
that helps with job search and placement, education and skills
training and community work experience; WEJT now operates in
26 counties in Wisconsin and will soon be serving
approximately 19,000 welfare recipients annually.
-- Work Supplementation Program (WSP): an on-the-job training
program that provides a subsidy to employers to hire job-ready
welfare recipients as full-time employees; applicants are
carefully screened; if it is determined they possess the
necessary job skills they are presented to employers, who make
the hiring decisions.
-- Employment Search Program (ESP): a program that helps with
job search skills and interviewing techniques; targeted to
AFDC recipients who are "job ready."
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-- Food stamp Employment and Training Program: another program
that emphasizes the development of job skills having a work
experience component at non-profit work sites and educational
and vocational training sites.
-- Child Care: the state provides a subsidy for child care for
those who leave welfare and become employed.
-- Health Care: Families who get off AFDC are permitted to
continue receiving medical assistance for a year after their
AFDC benefits have expired. Wisconsin is also piloting a state
health insurance program for those who do not have medical
insurance and are not otherwise eligible for medical
assistance.
In addition to these targeted programs, Wisconsin also
allows the $30 + 1/3 Earned Income Disregard to continue for
12 months after an AFDC recipient becomes employed. This, in
effect, allows the person to continue to receive a portion of
the AFDC benefit for a year after becoming employed.
Children's Income Security Supplement
One program that received statewide press coverage recently
is state assembly speaker Tom Loftus' Children's Income
Security Supplement. Operational only in Oneida County, this
is a program that combines child support and a child support
supplement, a work expense offset and health insurance for
dependent children in a package of benefits for poor working
mothers. These benefits gradually decrease as the employment
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income increases. They end completely when the mother is
earning an annual income of $16,000.
Loftus sees his plan as a "laboratory" to test the
feasibility of ending welfare throughout the state. This is
very similar to the approach taken by the Milwaukee Jobs
Commitment. In fact, Loftus developed his plan after studying
the proposals of the Milwaukee Jobs commitment. Key to both
plans is employment is the alternative to welfare. He has
ruled out Milwaukee County as a testing ground for the
project, as has Milwaukee County Executive David Schulz.
Schulz said he was not sure Milwaukee County would be a good
testing ground for Loftus' program because of the size of the
county's welfare rolls. Since the Children's Income Security
Supplement has been operational only since January, 1990, it
is too early to measure the results.
Next Door Foundation
The Next Door Foundation, funded by the United Way, is
working to involve 650 youths and young adults in a three-
year project in employability skills training, job placement
and career counseling. It is the goal of the foundation to
develop a working partnership with the Milwaukee business
community, which, it projects, will result in employment
opportunities for 450 young adults, ages 17 to 25.
Although both the above programs are indeed worthy, they
address only part of the problem. The true solution must
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address the total problem of poverty, not only for those areas
of the state that have more employable residents nor for only
younger people who mayor may not have a family to support.
In Other states
Project Chance -- Illinois
Nearly 132,000 clients found jobs through Illinois's
Project Chance's in its first three years of operation,
however the program has not been considered entirely
successful. In the 12-month period that ended June 30, 1988,
53 , 752 poor people throughout the state of Illinois found
jobs, at a price tag of $433.3 million (Reardon & Silverman,
1988). This equates to a cost per job of $8,061.
Although 53,752 seems to be a sizeable number of jobs, this
number represents jobs throughout the entire state. The
number of poor in Cook County alone was estimated to number
754,000 in 1984 (Kallenback and Lyons, 1986).
Inner-city black Chicagoans with inadequate education and
Iittle work experience have not been able to find jobs,
despite the $433.3-million-a-year price tag for Project
Chance. Most of those who did find employment through the
project were people who would have an easier opportunity to
find employment, with or without Project Chance, because of
their skills and motivation. These were principally down-
state Whites with good job skills. Only one-third of the
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Blacks comprised 72 percent of the program's caseload (Reardon
and Silverman, 1988).
Project Chance administrator Randale R. Valenti
acknowledges that the problem of finding jobs for hard-core
unemployed has not been solved. However he said that the
program has been successful in teaching people skills and
getting them to believe that they sometime may eventually get
out of the welfare system. He said he sees Project Chance as
a "process" rather than a "product." with Project Chance the
"process " of getting people of a system of self-perpetuating
welfare has begun, according to Valenti (Reardon and
Silverman, 1988).
Greater Advantages for Independence (GAIN) -- California
This program, which was begun by San Francisco's mayor Art
Agnos also has had mixed success. It has a budget of $209
million a year, half of which is spent on education. A major
criticism of the program is that by design it has
disincentives for people getting off welfare. For example,
if an AFDC mother obtains a grant to participate in the
program, her child care benefits will be reduced. As a
result, welfare recipients have a disincentive to participate
(Walsh, 1988).
Another criticism of GAIN is that, even after participating
in the education facet of the program, most AFDC clients
cannot find jobs that pay them wages to at a sufficient level
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cannot find jobs that pay them wages to at a sufficient level
to compensate for their lost welfare benefits. As a result,
welfare recipients prefer to remain on welfare rather than to
accept low-paying jobs (Walsh, 1988).
San Diego Project
From July 1985 through June 1987, San Diego operated a
pilot project involving 10,500 of the most disadvantaged
welfare recipients. Participants included 8,000 welfare
recipients; 2,500 were kept out of the project, as a control
group. Fewer than half of those who were eligible actually
did participate in any given month.
The project was monitored by the Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation of New York, a nonprofit social science
research organization. It found that 46 percent of those in
the project secured jobs, as did 36 percent of those in the
comparison group. Those in the program earned, on average,
22 percent more than those not in the project. Welfare
payments dropped 8 percent to participants. At project end,
65.8 percent of the participants were still receiving welfare
payments, as were 72.4 percent of the control group. The
study concluded that this program was not a "quick fix" for
poverty (Stevens, 1988).
The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation also
studied similar projects in California, Maryland, Illinois,
Arkansas, Maine, New Jersey, Virginia and West Virginia. It
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job-search feature, paid for themselves (stevens, 1988).
Employment and Training Choices (ET) -- Massachusetts
This program began in 1983 as a voluntary program. Seventy
percent of the original participants are still employed and
the program has a waiting list of AFDC recipients. Half of
ET's $84 million annual budget is spent on child care. In
1988, ET spent $5,305 per job placement, which is contrasted
to the $1,794 expended per placement in the first year of the
project. Massachusetts has the lowest unemployment rate in
the country -- 3 percent, so it has a high demand for all
workers. This, in great part, contributes to the success of
ET, which is considered the most successful welfare
alternative in the country. Starting annual wages for ET
participants average near $13,500. When a 1986 study found
that low wages pushed 43 percent of ET's participants back
into welfare, a wage floor was established, requiring
employers to pay ET participants at least $6. 00 an hour
(Walsh, 1988). In Massachusetts the minimum wage is $5.50 an
hour.
ET also has a training component, so that participants can,
if needed, acquire the skills necessary to be successfully
employed. The average classroom training costs for an ET
participant are $3,500. The average cost for ET participants




Is the Milwaukee Jobs commitment a viable solution to the
problem of poverty in Milwaukee? Simply stated, the only real
solution to poverty is income. So, in that respect, a program
that provides income to those on poverty is a solution to
poverty. The real test is in the manner in which that income
is provided. Income which is earned in exchange for labor is
preferable to income which is merely distributed in a cash
transfer.
Cash transfers are neither equitable nor efficient. They
are inequitable in that it is not just for one person to get
money, merely by virtue of membership in the human race, while
another person must labor at a job that is often tiring and
difficult so that he too can acquire money.
Likewise, cash transfers are inefficient, in that they rob
people of their incentive to work. Even those who are
productive members of the labor force feel a disincentive to
work, when they see that others are given the same amount of
money for doing, essentially, nothing productive.
Another factor contributing to the inefficiency of cash
transfers is the cost involved in administering the transfer.
with the additional bureaucracy and paper-work, the actual
cost can be greater by as much as twenty percent than the
amount of the transfer.
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Philosophically, Milwaukee Jobs Commitment is a sound idea.
Any solution that attempts to make an individual self-
supporting is preferable to a welfare system that keeps people
dependent on doles for their livelihood. Operationally, the
various components of the project merit scrutiny:
The Voluntary Element
The voluntary element of the project is one of its
strengths. By having only those participants who wish to
work, many of the costs incurred in finding jobs for hard-core
unemployed will be eliminated. Women with young children often
prefer not to be employed. Cherry and Goldberg (1988) found
that of married women with children from 0 to 6 years of age
only 23 percent worked more than 1500 hours a year. Of married
women who have children from 6 to 18 years, 37 percent work
more than 1500 hours a year. If married women with children
prefer part-time jobs to full-time jobs, it follows that AFDC
recipients might also have a preference to either not work or
to not work full time.
The fact that the Milwaukee Jobs Commitment mirrors the job
marketplace is also one of its strengths. This program is not
targeted to a select few who meet limited criteria. The only
criteria are that the participant is poor and is willing to
participate. The non-selectivity of criteria reflect the
workplace as a whole, and thus replicates the job market.
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The subsidy
To achieve maximum efficiency and to be assured that those
who are currently working at low-wage jobs in the private
sector have an incentive to continue working, it is important
that the wage that private-sector workers achieve is greater
than the wage received by those in community-service jobs,
created by the government or by community organizations. The
cash transfers, community service jobs and wage supplements
must be designed in such a way that:
work is always encouraged
more work is always encouraged
work at higher paying jobs is always encouraged
work in the private sector is encouraged
married family life, in contrast to AFDC, is not
penalized.
This type of sUbsidy has been designed into the Milwaukee Jobs
commitment.
The ET program in Massachusetts requires employers to pay
participants at least $6 an hour. Massachusetts is able to
set such a high wage because of the low unemployment rate in
the state. In Milwaukee, on the other hand, where the
unemployment rate for minorities is estimated to be about 30
percent, employers have no economic incentive to pay a wage
much higher than the minimum, unless they cannot find workers.
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In the short run, Milwaukee Jobs Commitment can subsidize
workers who earn minimum wage so that they earn enough to have
a sustainable income above poverty. In the long run, however,
the consequences become more complex.
In essence, a subsidy to minimum wage workers results in
a raising of the level of the minimum wage. However, when a
subsidy is paid by a third party, a shifting occurs, in which
those who hire the workers have less of an economic interest
in efficiency in the workplace, as they are paying for only
a portion of the cost of the labor. Therefore, subsidized
employment does not truly reflect the typical operations in
a non-subsidized marketplace.
The subsidy also results in fewer jobs being available for
another sector of the economy, namely those who are working,
not with the intent of making a living, but who merely want
to augment the family's income or have a part-time job, while
pursuing other primary goals, such as attending school.
As long as their are fewer jobs available than there are
people to fill those jobs, subsidized employment will continue
to create inefficiencies and artificial shortages in the job
marketplace. It follows, therefore, that the only real
solution is to increase the number of jobs. However, jobs are
not created through government subsidies. They come about
through a robust economy and through an entrepreneurial
business climate.
Marginal workers lug down this type of dynamic business
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climate and, as previously explained, the subsidy does not
encourage efficiency and tends to perpetuate workers with
marginal performance.
If Milwaukee Jobs commitment becomes "grandfathered" by
the Milwaukee business community through the Greater Milwaukee
Committee , it will be a big plus for the project. Fundamental
to the success of the project is the availability of jobs.
These jobs must be provided by the Milwaukee business
community and the key organ of that community is the Greater
Milwaukee committee. Community service jobs, although they
are preferable to no jobs at all, will not solve the problem,
for they are not fueled by the supply and demand curve of the
economy. They are merely "make-work" jobs.
Marginal workers
In examining Project Chance in Chicago, ET in Massachusetts
and the San Diego Project, it is apparent that the major
consideration of any project must be the problem of the hard-
core unemployed. If the success of the project is jUdged
merely in terms of how many people were placed in jobs, the
analysis will be superficial, at best. The tough analysis of
the success of the project has to consider how many people who
are difficult to employ found jobs and kept jobs.
The initial cash outlay per job placement in the ET project
was $1,794. This was the expenditure for the easy-to-place
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workers. Five years later, when most of the easy-to-place
workers had already found jobs, the cash outlay per job
placement was $5,305 per worker. In Illinois' Project Chance
the average cost per job placement was $8,061. The proposed
costs for Milwaukee Jobs Comrnitment would be close to the
Illinois price tag at $7,793 per person.
Although ET's cost is less, the second part to the ET
scenario is that each worker had to make at least $6 an hour
plus benefits. This brings the total cost of wages and
benefits to over $8.00 an hour for each person employed.
Despite these large cash outlays, all of the welfare
projects cited earlier still were not able to place the hard-
core unemployed. The Milwaukee Jobs Commitment will be no
different. Easy-to-place workers that have job-entry skills
may be able to find jobs. The illiterate and unskilled will
not be served by the project.
It is important that decision-makers realize this caveat.
The Milwaukee Jobs Commitment is an attempt to provide jobs
of adequate income to those who are willing and able to work.
Its intent is to take this upper level of welfare recipients
off the welfare dole. The Milwaukee Jobs Commitment does not
address the problem of the hard-core unemployed.
Training
Milwaukee Jobs commitment has only a minimal commitment to
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training of workers. This reflects the previously mentioned
designed of the program, in that it is finding jobs for only
those who are most employable. As pointed out earlier, ET
expended an average of $3,500 per participant for those who
needed classroom training and $2,700 per participant for on-
the-job training.
The Milwaukee community many find that a continuation of
the current system of welfare may be more cost-effective in
dealing with the unemployable, i.e. those who cannot find jobs
because their skill levels are so minimal or those who simply
do not want to work.
If Milwaukee Jobs commitment were to become norm for the
Milwaukee community, rather than to be limited to a pilot
project, the voluntary aspect of the program would be subject
to debate. The Milwaukee community would have to decide at
that time whether it would be willing to make the level of
commitment to the poor to solve the deep-seeded problems of
unemployment.
Milwaukee may decide to maintain a dual system -- one which
offers both a welfare system and a jobs program. The design
of such a system must be such that welfare recipients receive
SUbstantially less than workers, so that those who simply
receive cash transfers will have an economic motivation to get
off welfare and to become employed.
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Income Deficit
In dollars and cents, taking into account nothing more than
money, the cost of eliminating poverty is sUbstantially
reduced. The Census Bureau has devised for determining only
the dollar cost, the "income deficit."
-"Income deficit is the difference between the total income
of families and unrelated individuals below the poverty
level, and their respective poverty thresholds. In
computing the income deficit, families reporting a net
income loss are assigned zero dollars and for such cases
the deficit is equal to the poverty threshold. The measure
provides an estimate of the amount which would be required
to raise the incomes of all poor families and unrelated
individuals to their respective poverty thresholds. The
income deficit is thus a measure of the degree of
impoverishment of a family or unrelated individual. "
In 1985 the income deficit, according to the Census Bureau
$46.169 billion. Poor people nationwide represented 14
percent of the population or 33,100,000. The per person cost
to get out of poverty in 1985 would have been only $1,394. It
is determined by dividing the number of poor people by the
aggregate income deficit.
In contrast, under our current system of welfare, the
expenditures per poor person in Milwaukee County in 1988 were
$ 8,795. The budgeted cost for the Milwaukee Jobs Commitment
will be $7,793 per person. Although either program is very
expensive when contrasted to the income deficit, Milwaukee
Jobs Commitment will be $1,000 less per participant than the
current welfare program.
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However, even if the costs were equal, a program which
would take people off welfare, giving them the opportunity to
work and the cash incentive to do so, if they desire, is
certainly more cost effective than the current system of
welfare, for reasons outlined previously.
Reasons for Choosing Not to Work
The decision not to work is often freely made. Many times
the lack of jobs is not the determinant for people not to
work. Unemployment is often a voluntary choice in that many
job seekers, both on and off welfare, refuse to take some
available jobs for merely personal reasons. For example, the
jobs may not pay enough or they may not be palatable to the
unemployed person. Lawrence Mead (1987) found that nation-
wide only 40 percent of adults who work less than full-time
give inability to find a job as the main reason, and only 11
percent of those not working at all do so.
This information points out an important consideration in
the evaluation and design of any type of voluntary job
program. If jobs are to be an alternative to welfare, those
jobs must have two components, namely they must pay enough and
they must be acceptable to the job-seeker. The Milwaukee Jobs




In 1988 David Long published a study of the budgetary
impacts of four welfare employment programs as relating to
savings in government spending. He analyzed a five-year
period in which workfare programs were operable in four areas
of the country -- San Diego, Baltimore, Arkansas and Virginia.
The San Diego program included mandatory job-search and
work experience for AFDC applicants. The Baltimore provided
job-search assistance, work experience, education and/or
training to AFDC applicants and recipients, in which
participation in at least one component was required. The
Arkansas program required job-search for all AFDC applicants
and recipients, and assigned some individuals to work
experience. The Virginia program provided mandatory job-
search assistance for AFDC applicants and recipients, followed
by work experience, education or training (for some).
Table 5.1, compiled by Long, lists budget impacts of the
four programs on government spending. The Table includes
estimated impacts per enrollee over five years. Long chose
the five-year period so that some of the extraordinary costs,
such as start-up costs and lags in disqualifications for
sUbsidies, would be averaged into the results.
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Table 5.1
Governmental Budget Impacts per Welfare Employment Enrollee
OVer a Five-Year Period
Levels of Government
Budget Impacts Federal state & Local Total
------------------------------------------------------------
San Diego
Increased tax payments $474 $46 $520
Reduced use of AFDC 414 416 830
Reduced use other programs 355 88 443
Program costs -462 -201 -663
Net budget impact 781 349 1130
Baltimore
Increased tax payments 241 60 300
Reduced use of AFDC 56 56 111
Reduced use other programs 351 37 388
Program costs -696 -342 -1038
Net budget impact -48 -189 -238
Arkansas
Increased tax payments 57 10 67
Reduced use of AFDC 407 246 653
Reduced use other programs 117 27 144
Program costs -146 -12 -158
Net bUdget impact 435 271 709
Virginia
Increased tax payments 200 17 216
Reduced use of AFDC 164 161 325
Reduced use other programs 72 93 115
Program costs -335 -95 -430
Net budget impact 101 126 226
Note: Because of rounding, detail may not sum to totals.
Local governments include county and city governments.
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New Hope Project Task Force Report
On July 9, 1990, Kenneth willis issued the Greater
Milwaukee Committee's Task Force Report regarding the
Milwaukee Jobs commitment. The task force, which began in
October, 1989, was formed to study the feasibility of the
project.
The task force did endorse the Milwaukee Jobs commitment
project. On the advice of Professor Robert Haveman of the
LaFollette Institute at the university of Wisconsin-Madison,
the task force recommended a rigorous evaluation component be
structured into the design of the project. It recommended
that $1 million be budgeted over the three-year duration of
the project to be used solely for this evaluation.
Following are the specific recommendations of the task
force regarding the evaluation process. They are excerpted
from the "New Hope Project Task Force Report" (1990).
"The two neighborhoods will be studied to identify
eligible and ineligible residents (based on income and
age) . The eligible groups will be divided into two
parts: participants and control groups. Next,
characteristics will be identified to ensure that the
eligible group is representative of the number and
variety of the unemployed and working poor in the area.
This will allow the project to randomly select and match
like people from the participant group with persons from
the control group. Evaluation is a key ingredient to
the success of this project. It must be properly
designed in order to permit appropriate findings that
will be viewed as objectives by the academic community.
We will not know true results of the New Hope Project
without a carefully organized and randomly selected
target population that permits appropriate evaluation.
The evaluation will look at changes in individuals'
income, welfare status, and work status. Measures will
include:
whether there has been substantial increase in income;
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whether the length of time on job has improved over
three years;
and whether the amount of sUbsidy required has
decreased. Proposed numbers that would signify
success would include reducing welfare usage by 33%
compared to the control group, while increasing income
above poverty (without sUbsidy) by 50% over the
control group.
Only the most tentative design can be suggested at this
time, pending finalization of the project design. Below
are some suggested features of such a design:
First, it may be prudent to forego any hope of measuring
community effects in any rigorous way. The migration
problems, the small magnitude of the experiment, and the
difficulties associated with measuring such effects
probably preclude any realistic hope for measurable effects
at this level of aggregation.
Second, a neighborhood census (or partial census based
upon a sample of households) should still be done. This
will provide some notion of the baseline target population
characteristics, allow the participant group to be compared
to that population, and (perhaps) assist in the outreach
effort.
Third, some form of "blocking" or selection of potential
participants according to preselected criterion beyond what
is envisioned currently may be prudent. For example, what
are the implications if most of the available slots are
filled by less disadvantaged persons (or by larger size
families , given the larger supplements for bigger families)
who move into the neighborhood to avail themselves of the
program supplements.
Fourth, during the process of generating a pool of
potentially eligible participants, some type of random
assignment to an experiment and control group must be made.
without an experimental design it will be impossible to
argue convincingly that any measurable outcomes are not
artifacts of selectivity or changes in contextual
circumstances (e.g. abrupt changes in the labor market).
Fifth, data on both participants and controls must be
collected at several points in time. The intended effects
are both short- and long-term. An in-depth baseline data
would be required, followed by a continuous stream of labor
market and income data. Moreover, additional data on how
the individual/family is functioning should be collected
on a periodic basis. Data collection should extend beyond
the individual participation in the program and/or the
termination of the program itself.
Sixth, attrition will be a significant problem -- both
in terms of individuals selecting themselves out of the
program and loss of contact with those in the control or
non-participating experimental group.
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Seventh, the criterion measures need more discussion.
Clearly economic well-being reductions in dependency and
upward occupational mobility' are important. but many other
measures of individual, family, and social functioning must
also be important -- some of which may be difficult to tap
in a meaningful way. Further, micro-level quantitative
data should be supplemented by qualitative data exploring
how the program works and what participants actually
experience."
In Conclusion
Should the Milwaukee Jobs Commitment be pursued? My answer
is yes, with reservations. The availability of jobs is
dependent on the ability of the community to provide them.
Milwaukee Jobs Commitment is essentially a jobs program. with
its broad base of support from the Milwaukee business,
political, religious and social sectors, the program has the
community backing it needs to be successful.
However, Milwaukee Jobs Commitment must be more flexible
and creative in leveraging off some of the programs already
operating under the BEST umbrella. Milwaukee Jobs Commitment
needs to re-evaluate ways in which it can interface with
programs such as the State Health Insurance Program, and
state-run programs that provide child care sUbsidies,
subsidies to employers who hire former AFDC recipients and
some of the numerous training and job-readiness programs.
The philosophical stance taken by the steering committee
during the design stage of the project, to avoid any type of
governmental funding, is not easily accepted by potential
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benefactors, especially in light of the numerous innovative
welfare alternative programs that are already in operation
throughout the state.
The goal of Milwaukee Jobs commitment is to provide
participants with a path to self-sufficiency through jobs that
realistically compensate them for their labor. Their
remuneration must exceed those foregone benefits they would
have received had they been on welfare. This is indeed a
worthy goal.
